Charles Canady is a justice of the Supreme Court of Florida. He has served in that role since 2008, and he served as the court’s chief justice from 2010 to 2012. Prior to his appointment, Justice Canady served as a judge of the Florida Second District Court of Appeal and as a member of the United States House of Representatives for four terms. Justice Canady is a graduate of Yale Law School.
—Donald J. Trump Finalizes List of Potential Supreme Court Justice Picks
Some Reflections on Impeachment
In a 1999 speech to the Miami Lawyers Division of the Federalist Society, then-Congressman Canady argued that impeachment serves a dual constitutional function: first as a check on executive power and second as a mechanism to ensure a high standard of integrity in office.
Hurst v. Florida
A majority of the court invalidated Florida’s death penalty statute, holding that the death penalty may only be imposed by a unanimous jury. Justice Canady dissented, arguing that the Sixth Amendment does not compel the majority’s result.
State v. Phillips
Phillips was a convicted sexual predator. He served his prison term, but four months after what should have been his release date, the state initiated civil commitment proceedings against him. A majority found that timeline constitutionally problematic. Dissenting, Justice Canady reasoned that substantive due process does not preclude a state from bringing a confinement petition simply because the “process is initiated at at time when the person is in custody due to legal error.”
League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner
The Florida Supreme Court ordered the redrawing of select congressional districts. Justice Canady’s dissent accused the majority of ignoring separation of powers principles and exceeding the proper scope of appellate court review.
Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co.
In a seminal Florida class certification case, Justice Canady dissented from the majority’s approach to commonality. The majority emphasized Safeway’s “common course of conduct and business practice” overcharging members of the class. Justice Canady instead reasoned that Sosa could not show a course of conduct evidencing Safeway’s knowing violation of a statute.
Soper v. Tire Kingdom, Inc.
Justice Canady dissented, urging the court to overturn Sosa and replace it with the Supreme Court’s approach to certification in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes.
In re Turner
Justice Canady’s dissent argues that Florida’s blanket ban on judicial candidates’ personal solicitation of campaign contributions violates the First Amendment.
Hall v. State
In Hall v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Hall, death row inmate with an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower, could show an intellectual disability “by presenting additional evidence regarding difficulties in adaptive functioning.” On remand, a majority of the Florida Supreme Court held Hall’s post-conviction motion established an intellectual disability. Justice Canady dissented, arguing that the Florida Supreme Court should have remanded to the trial court to determine the factual issue by way of an evidentiary hearing, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s logic.
Tracey v. State
A majority suppressed evidence obtained after police accessed the defendant’s cell site location data without a warrant. Justice Canady dissented, arguing that accessing the cell site location data did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Canady reasoned that cell site location data fell within the third-party disclosure doctrine. Canady analogized a pen register’s automatic collection of phone numbers as metadata to the cell tower’s automatic collection of GPS information as metadata. Therefore, Tracey had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his cell site location data.
Atwater v. Kortum
Justice Canady’s majority opinion strikes down a state statute regulating solicitation by public insurance adjusters. The regulation sought to limit public adjusters’ attempts to solicit business in the wake of the devastating hurricanes in 2004 and 2005. But Canady, writing for the majority, found the regulation ran afoul of the state’s commercial speech protections, and was not narrowly tailored to the state’s interests.